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Abstract
This paper investigates the convergence of learning dynamics in Stackelberg games. In the class of games we
consider, there is a hierarchical game being played between a leader and a follower with continuous action
spaces. We show that in zero-sum games, the only stable attractors of the Stackelberg gradient dynamics
are Stackelberg equilibria. This insight allows us to develop a gradient-based update for the leader that
converges to Stackelberg equilibria in zero-sum games and the set of stable attractors in general-sum games.
We then consider a follower employing a gradient-play update rule instead of a best response strategy and
propose a two-timescale algorithm with similar asymptotic convergence results. For this algorithm, we also
provide finite-time high probability bounds for local convergence to a neighborhood of a stable Stackelberg
equilibrium in general-sum games.
1. Introduction
Tools from game theory now play a prominent role in machine learning. The emerging coupling between the
fields can be credited to the formulation of learning problems as interactions between competing algorithms
and the desire to characterize the limiting behaviors of such strategic interactions. Indeed, game theory
provides a systematic framework to model the strategic interactions found in modern machine learning
problems.
A significant portion of the game theory literature concerns games of simultaneous play and equilibrium
analysis. In simultaneous play games, each player reveals the strategy they have selected concurrently. The
solution concept often adopted in non-cooperative simultaneous play games is the Nash equilibrium. In a
Nash equilibrium, the strategy of each player is a best response to the joint strategy of the competitors so
that no player can benefit from unilaterally deviating from this strategy.
The study of equilibrium gives rise to the question of when and why the observed play in a game can
be expected to correspond to an equilibrium. A common explanation is that an equilibrium emerges as the
long run outcome of a process in which players repeatedly play a game and compete for optimality over
time [22]. Consequently, an important topic in the study of learning in games is the convergence behavior
of learning algorithms reflecting the underlying game dynamics. Adopting this viewpoint and analyzing
so-called ‘natural’ dynamics [7] often provides deep insights into the structure of a game. Moreover, a
firm understanding of the structure of a game can inform how to design learning algorithms strictly for
computing equilibria. Seeking equilibria via computationally efficient learning algorithms is an equally
important perspective on equilibrium analysis [22].
The classic objectives of learning in games are now being widely embraced in the machine learning
community. While not encompassing, the prevailing research areas epitomizing this phenomenon are ad-
versarial training and multi-agent learning. A substantial amount of interest has been given to Generative
Adversarial Networks (GANs) [23]. Finding Nash equilibria in GANs is a challenging and there is a surge
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of interest in developing principled training algorithms for this purpose [3, 25, 37, 39, 40, 42]. The majority
of these works attempt to use second-order gradient information to speed-up convergence. In our work, we
draw connections to this literature and believe that the problem we study gives an under-explored perspective
that may provide valuable insights moving forward.
Characterizing the outcomes of competitive interactions and seeking equilibria in multi-agent learning
gained prominence much earlier than adversarial training. However, following initial works on this topic [24,
27, 35], scrutiny was given to the solution concepts being considered and the field cooled [55]. Owing to
the arising applications with interacting agents, problems of this form are being studied extensively again.
There has been a shift toward analyzing gradient-based learning rules, in part due to their scalability and
success in single-agent reinforcement learning, and rigorous convergence analysis [3, 21, 33, 38, 59].
The progress analyzing learning dynamics and seeking equilibria in games is promising, but the work
has been narrowly focused on simultaneous play games and the Nash equilibrium solution concept. There
are many problems exhibiting a hierarchical order of play between agents in a diverse set of fields such
as human-robot collaboration and interacting autonomous systems in artificial intelligence [20, 36, 45, 53],
mechanism design and control [19, 50, 51], and organizational structures in economics [2, 13]. In game
theory, this type of game is known as a Stackelberg game and the solution concept studied is called a
Stackelberg equilibrium.
In the simplest formulation of a Stackelberg game, there is a leader and a follower that interact in a
hierarchical structure. The sequential order of play is such that the leader is endowed with the power to
select an action with the knowledge that the follower will then play a best-response. Specifically, the leader
uses this knowledge to its advantage when selecting a strategy.
In this paper, we study the convergence of learning dynamics in Stackelberg games. Our motivation
stems from the emergence of problems in which there is a distinct order of play between interacting learning
agents and the lack of existing theoretical convergence guarantees in this domain. The dynamics analyzed in
this work reflect the underlying game structure and characterize the expected outcomes of hierarchical game
play. The rigorous study of the learning dynamics in Stackelberg games we provide also has implications
for simultaneous play games relevant to adversarial training.
Contributions. We formulate and study a novel set of gradient-based learning rules in continuous, general-
sum games that emulate the natural structure of a Stackelberg game. Building on work characterizing a local
Nash equilibrium in continuous games [49], we define the differential Stackelberg equilibrium solution con-
cept, which is a local notion of a Stackelberg equilibrium amenable to computation. We remark that in the
special case of zero-sum games, a local minimax equilibrium concept that is analogous to the solution con-
cept we provide has been concurrently developed [28]. In our work, we draw several connections between
Nash and Stackelberg equilibria for the class of zero-sum games, which can be summarized as follows:
• We show that stable Nash equilibria are differential Stackelberg equilibria in zero-sum games. Con-
current with our work, Jin et al. [28] show that local Nash equilibria are local minimax equilibria. This
result is equivalent to ours, simply with contrasting nomenclature.
• We reveal that there exist stable attractors of simultaneous gradient play that are Stackelberg equilibria
and not Nash equilibria. While Jin et al. [28] develop an equivalent result, we go a step further and
characterize necessary and sufficient conditions under which stable attractors of the gradient play
dynamics avoid Nash equilibria and converge to Stackelberg equilibria.
Our primary contributions concern the convergence behavior of the gradient-based learning rules we formu-
late that mirror the Stackelberg game structure. These contributions can be summarized as follows:
• We demonstrate that the only stable attractors of the Stackelberg gradient dynamics are Stackelberg
equilibria in zero-sum games. This allows us to define a gradient-based learning rule for the leader
that provably converges to Stackelberg equilibria in zero-sum games.
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• Leveraging the Stackelberg game structure, for general-sum games, we formulate a gradient-based
learning rule in which the leader and follower have an unbiased estimator of their gradient so that
updates are stochastic.
• We consider the setting in which follower uses a gradient-play update rule instead of an exact best
response strategy and propose a two-timescale algorithm to learn Stackelberg equilibria. We show al-
most sure asymptotic convergence to Stackelberg equilibria in zero-sum games and to stable attractors
in general-sum games; a finite-time high probability bound for local convergence to a neighborhood
of a stable Stackelberg equilibrium in general-sum games is also given.
• We present this paper with a single leader and a single follower, but this is only for ease of presentation.
The extension to N followers that play in a staggered hierarchical structure or simultaneously is in
Appendix C; equivalent results hold with some additional assumptions.
Related Work. The perspective we explore on analyzing games in which there is an order of play or hi-
erarchical decision making structure has been generally ignored in the modern learning literature. However,
this viewpoint has long been researched in the control literature on games [4, 5, 29, 47, 48]. Similarly, work
on bilevel optimization [16, 17, 58] adopts this perspective.
The select few recent works in the machine learning literature on learning in games considering a hierar-
chical decision-making structure exclusively focus on zero-sum games [18, 28, 34, 42, 46], unlike our work,
which extends to general-sum games. A noteworthy paper in the line of work in the zero-sum setting adopt-
ing a min-max perspective was the introduction of unrolled GANs [42]. The authors consider a timescale
separation between the generator and discriminator, giving the generator the advantage as the slower player.
This work used the Schur complement structure presented in Danskin [16, 17] to define a minimax solu-
tion of a zero-sum game abstraction of an adversarial training objective. Essentially the discriminator is
allowed to perform a finite roll-out in an inner loop of the algorithm with additional updates; this process
is referred to as ‘unrolling’. It is (informally) suggested that, using the results of Danskin [16, 17], as the
roll-out horizon approaches infinity, the discriminator approaches a critical point of the cost function along
the discriminators axis given a fixed generator parameter configuration.
The unrolling procedure has the same effect as a deterministic timescale separation between players.
Formal convergence guarantees to minimax equilibria in zero-sum games characterizing the limiting behav-
ior of simultaneous individual gradient descent with timescale separation were recently obtained [28, 34].
While related, simultaneous individual gradient play with time-scale separation is a distinct set of dynamics
that departs from the dynamics we propose that reflect the Stackelberg game structure.
It is also worth pointing out that the multi-agent learning papers of Foerster et al. [21] and Letcher et al.
[33] do in some sense seek to give a player an advantage, but nevertheless focus on the Nash equilibrium
concept in any analysis that is provided.
Organization. In Section 2, we formalize the problem we study and provide background material on
Stackelberg games. We then draw connections between learning in Stackelberg games and existing work in
zero-sum and general sum-games relevant to GANs and multi-agent learning, respectively. In Section 3, we
give a rigorous convergence analysis of learning in Stackelberg games. Numerical examples are provided in
Section 4 and we conclude in Section 5.
2. Preliminaries
We leverage the rich theory of continuous games and dynamical systems in order to analyze algorithms im-
plemented by agents interacting in a hierarchical game. In particular, each agent has an objective they want
to selfishly optimize that depends on not only their own actions but also on the actions of their competitor.
However, there is an order of play in the sense that one player is the leader and the other player is the fol-
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lower1. The leader optimizes its objective with the knowledge that the follower will respond by selecting
a best response. We refer to algorithms for learning in this setting as hierarchical learning algorithms. We
specifically consider a class of learning algorithms in which the agents act myopically with respect to their
given objective and role in the underlying hierarchical game by following the gradient of their objective with
respect to their choice variable.
To substantiate this abstraction, consider a game between two agents where one agent is deemed the
leader and the other the follower. The leader has cost f1 : X → R and the follower has cost f2 : X → R,
whereX = X1×X2 with the action space of the leader beingX1 and the action space of the follower being
X2. The designation of ‘leader’ and ‘follower’ indicates the order of play between the two agents, meaning
the leader plays first and the follower second. The leader and the follower need not be cooperative. Such a
game is known as a Stackelberg game.
2.1 Stackelberg Games
Let us adopt the typical game theoretic notation in which the player index set is I and x−i = (xj)j∈I/{i}
denotes the joint action profile of all agents excluding agent i. In the Stackelberg case, I = {1, 2} where
player i = 1 is the leader and player i = 2 is the follower. We assume throughout that each fi is sufficiently
smooth, meaning fi ∈ Cq(X,R) for some q ≥ 2 and for each i ∈ I.
The leader aims to solve the optimization problem given by
min
x1∈X1
{
f1(x1, x2)
∣∣ x2 ∈ arg min
y∈X2
f2(x1, y)
}
and the follower aims to solve the optimization problem minx2∈X2 f2(x1, x2). As noted above, the learning
algorithms we study are such that the agents follow myopic update rules which take steps in the direction
of steepest descent with respect to the above two optimizations problems, the former for the leader and the
latter for the follower.
Before formalizing these updates, let us first discuss the equilibrium concept studied for simultaneous
play games and contrast it with that which is studied in the hierarchical play counterpart. The typical
equilibrium notion in continuous games is the pure strategy Nash equilibrium in simultaneous play games
and the Stackelberg equilibrium in hierarchical play games. Each notion of equilibria can be characterized
as the intersection points of the reaction curves of the players [4].
Definition 1 (Nash Equilibrium). The joint strategy x∗ ∈ X is a Nash equilibrium if for each i ∈ I,
fi(x
∗) ≤ fi(xi, x∗−i), ∀ xi ∈ Xi.
The strategy is a local Nash equilibrium on W ⊂ X if for each i ∈ I,
fi(x
∗) ≤ fi(xi, x∗−i), ∀ xi ∈Wi ⊂ Xi.
Definition 2 (Stackelberg Equilibrium). In a two-player game with player 1 as the leader, a strategy x∗1 ∈
X1 is called a Stackelberg equilibrium strategy for the leader if
sup
x2∈R(x∗1)
f1(x
∗
1, x2) ≤ sup
x2∈R(x1)
f1(x1, x2), ∀x1 ∈ X1,
whereR(x1) = {y ∈ X2| f2(x1, y) ≤ f2(x1, x2), ∀x2 ∈ X2} is the rational reaction set of x2.
1. While we present the work for a single leader and a single follower, the theory extends to the multi-follower case (we discuss
this in Appendix C) and to the case where the single leader abstracts multiple cooperating agents.
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This definition naturally extends to the n-follower setting when R(x1) is replaced with the set of Nash
equilibria NE(x1), given that player 1 is playing x1 so that the follower’s reaction set is a Nash equilibrium.
We denote Difi as the derivative of fi with respect to xi, Dijfi as the partial derivative of Difi with
respect to xj , and D(·) as the total derivative2. Denote by ω(x) = (D1f1(x), D2f2(x)) the vector of indi-
vidual gradients for simultaneous play and ωS(x) = (Df1(x), D2f2(x)) as the equivalent for hierarchical
play where Df1 is the total derivative of f1 with respect to x1 and x2 is implicitly a function of x2, which
captures the fact that the leader operates under the assumption that the follower will play a best response to
its choice of x1.
It is possible to characterize a local Nash equilibrium using sufficient conditions for Definition 1.
Definition 3 (Differential Nash Equilibrium [49]). The joint strategy x∗ ∈ X is a differential Nash equilib-
rium if ω(x∗) = 0 and D2i fi(x
∗) > 0 for each i ∈ I.
Analogous sufficient conditions can be stated to characterize a local Stackelberg equilibrium strategy
for the leader using first and second order conditions on the leader’s optimization problem. Indeed, if
Df1(x
∗
1, r(x
∗
1)) = 0 and D
2f1(x
∗
1, r(x
∗
1)) is positive definite, then x
∗
1 is a local Stackelberg equilibrium
strategy for the leader. We use these sufficient conditions to define the following refinement of the Stackel-
berg equilibrium concept.
Definition 4 (Differential Stackelberg Equilibrium). The pair (x∗1, x∗2) ∈ X with x∗2 = r(x∗1), where r is
implicitly defined by D2f2(x∗1, x∗2) = 0, is a differential Stackelberg equilibrium for the game (f1, f2) with
player 1 as the leader if Df1(x∗1, r(x∗1)) = 0, and D2f1(x∗1, r(x∗1)) is positive definite..
Remark 1. Before moving on, let us make a few remarks about similar, and in some cases analogous,
equilibrium definitions. In the zero-sum setting, the differential Stackelberg equilibrium notion is the same
as a local min-max equilibrium for a sufficiently smooth cost function f . This is a well-known concept
in optimization (see, e.g., [4, 16, 17], among others), and it has recently been introduced in the learning
literature [28]. In the general-sum setting, such a characterization is not surprising as its derivation is
simply from considering sufficient conditions for local optimality respecting the order of play.
We utilize these local characterizations in terms of first and second order conditions to formulate the
myopic hierarchical learning algorithms we study. Following the preceding discussion, consider the learning
rule for each player to be given by
xi,k+1 = xi,k − γi,k(ωS,i(xk) + wi,k+1), (1)
recalling that ωS = (Df1(x), D2f2(x)) and the notation ωS,i indicates the entry of ωS corresponding to
the i–th player. Moreover, {γi,k} the sequence of learning rates and {wi,k} is the noise process for player
i, both of which satisfy the usual assumptions from theory of stochastic approximation provided in detail
in Section 3. We note that the component of the update ωS,i(xk) + wi,k+1 captures the case in which each
agent does not have oracle access to ωS,i, but instead has an unbiased estimator for it. The given update
formalizes the class of learning algorithms we study in this paper.
Leader-Follower Timescale Separation. We require a timescale separation between the leader and the
follower: the leader is assumed to be learning at a slower rate than the follower so that γ1,k = o(γ2,k). The
reason for this timescale separation is that the leader’s update is formulated using the reaction curve of the
follower. In the gradient-based learning setting considered, the reaction curve can be characterized by the
set of critical points of f2(x1,k, ·) that have a local positive definite structure in the direction of x2, which is
{x2| D2f2(x1,k, x2) = 0, D22f2(x1,k, x2) > 0}.
2. For example, given a function f(x, y(x)), Df = D1f +D2f∂y/∂x.
5
FIEZ, CHASNOV, RATLIFF
This set can be characterized in terms of an implicit map r, defined by the leader’s belief that the follower is
playing a best response to its choice at each iteration, which would imply D2f2(x1,k, x2,k) = 0. Moreover,
under sufficient regularity conditions, the implicit mapping theorem [32] gives rise to the implicit map
r : U → X2 : x1 7→ x2 on a neighborhood U ⊂ X1 of x1,k. Formalized in Section 3, we note that when
r is defined uniformly in x1 on the domain for which convergence is being assessed, the update in (1) is
well-defined in the sense that the component of the derivativeDf1 corresponding to the implicit dependence
of the follower’s action on x1 via r is well-defined and locally consistent. In particular, for a given point
x = (x1, x2) such that D2f2(x1, x2) = 0 with D22f2(x) an isomorphism, the implicit function theorem
implies there exists an open set U ⊂ X1 such that there exists a unique continuously differentiable function
r : U → X2 such that r(x1) = x2 and D2f2(x1, r(x1)) = 0 for all x1 ∈ U . Moreover,
Dr(x1) = −(D22f2)−1(x1, r(x1))D21f2(x1, r(x1))
on U . Thus, in the limit of the two-timescale setting, the leader sees the follower as having equilibriated
(meaning D2f2 ≡ 0) so that
Df1(x1, x2) = D1f1(x1, x2) +D2f1(x1, x2)Dr(x1) (2)
= D1f1(x1, x2)−D2f1(x1, x2)(D22f2)−1(x1, x2)D21f2(x1, x2).
The map r is an implicit representation of the follower’s reaction curve.
Overview of Analysis Techniques. The following describes the general approach to studying the hierar-
chical learning dynamics in (1). The purpose of this overview is to provide the reader with the high-level
architecture of the analysis approach.
The analysis techniques we employ combine tools from dynamical systems theory with the theory of
stochastic approximation. In particular, we leverage the limiting continuous time dynamical systems derived
from (1) to characterize concentration bounds for iterates or samples generated by (1). We note that the
hierarchical learning update in (1) with timescale separation γ1,k = o(γ2,k) has a limiting dynamical system
that takes the form of a singularly perturbed dynamical system given by
x˙1(t) = −τDf1(x1(t), x2(t))
x˙2(t) = −D2f2(x1(t), x2(t)) (3)
which, in the limit as τ → 0, approximates (1).
The limiting dynamical system has known convergence properties (asymptotic convergence in a region
of attraction for a locally asymptotically stable attractor). Such convergence properties can be translated in
some sense to the discrete time system by comparing pseudo-trajectories—in this case, linear interpolations
between sample points of the update process—generated by sample points of (1) and the limiting system
flow for initializations containing the set of sample points of (1). Indeed, the limiting dynamical system is
then used to generate flows initialized from the sample points generated by (1). Creating pseudo-trajectories,
we then bound the probability that the pseudo-trajectories deviate by some small amount from the limiting
dynamical system flow over each continuous time interval between the sample points. A concentration
bound can be constructed by taking a union bound over each time interval after a finite time; following this
we can guarantee the sample path has entered the region of attraction, on which we can produce a Lyapunov
function for the continuous time dynamical system. The analysis in this paper is based on the high-level
ideas outlined in this section.
2.2 Connections and Implications
Before presenting convergence analysis of the update in (1), we draw some connections to application
domains—including adversarial learning, where zero-sum game abstractions have been touted for finding
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robust parameter configurations for neural networks, and opponent shaping in multi-agent learning—and
equilibrium concepts commonly used in these domains. Let us first remind the reader of some common
definitions from dynamical systems theory.
Given a sufficiently smooth function f ∈ Cq(X,R), a critical point x∗ of f is said to be stable if for all
t0 ≥ 0 and ε > 0, there exists δ(t0, ε) such that
x0 ∈ Bδ(x∗) =⇒ x(t) ∈ Bε(x∗), ∀t ≥ t0
Further, x∗ is said to be asymptotically stable if x∗ is additionally attractive—that is, for all t0 ≥ 0, there
exists δ(t0) such that
x0 ∈ Bδ(x∗) =⇒ lim
t→∞ ‖x(t)− x
∗‖ = 0.
A critical point is said to be non-degenerate if the determinant of the Jacobian of the dynamics at the critical
point is non-zero. For a non-degenerate critical point, the Hartman-Grobman theorem [54] enables us to
check the eigenvalues of the Jacobian to determine asymptotic stability. In particular, at a non-degenerate
critical point, if the eigenvalues of the Jacobian are in the open left-half complex plane, then the critical
point is asymptotically stable. The dynamical systems we study in this paper are of the form x˙ = −F (x)
for some vector field F determined by the gradient based update rules employed by the agents. Hence, to
determine if a critical point is stable, we simply need to check that the spectrum of the Jacobian of F is in
the open right-half complex plane.
For the dynamics x˙ = −ω(x), let J(x) denote the Jacobian of the vector field ω(x). Similarly, for the
dynamics x˙ = −ωS(x), let JS(x) denote the Jacobian of the vector field ωS(x). Then, we say a differential
Nash equilibrium of a continuous game with corresponding individual gradient vector field ω is stable if
spec(J(x)) ⊂ C◦+ where spec(·) denotes the spectrum of its argument and C◦+ denotes the open right-half
complex plane. Similarly, we say differential Stackelberg equilibrium is stable if spec(JS(x)) ⊂ C◦+.
2.2.1 Implications for Zero-Sum Settings
Zero-sum games are a very special class since there is a strong connection between Nash equilibria and
Stackelberg equilibria. Let us first show that for zero-sum settings, all attractors of x˙ = −ωS(x) are differ-
ential Stackelberg equilibria.
Proposition 1. For zero-sum games, all stable attractors of x˙ = −ωS(x) are differential Stackelberg equi-
libria.
Proof. The Jacobian of the Stackelberg limiting dynamics x˙ = −ωS(x) at a stable critical point is
JS(x) =
[
D1(Df)(x) 0
−D21f(x) −D22f(x)
]
> 0. (4)
The structure of the Jacobian JS(x) follows from the fact that
D2(Df)(x) = D12f(x)−D12f(x)(D22f)−1(x)D22f(x) = 0.
The eigenvalues of a lower triangular block matrix are the union of the eigenvalues in each of the block
diagonal components. This implies that if JS(x) > 0, then necessarily D1(Df)(x) > 0 and−D22f(x) > 0.
Consequently, any stable critical point of the Stackelberg limiting dynamics must be a differential Stackel-
berg equilibrium by definition.
The result of Proposition 1 implies that with appropriately chosen stepsizes the update rule in (1) will only
converge to Stackelberg equilibria and thus, unlike simultaneous play individual gradient descent (known
7
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as gradient-play in the game theory literature), will not converge to spurious locally asymptotically stable
attractors of the dynamics that are not relevant to the underlying game.
In a recent work on GANs [42], hierarchical learning of a similar nature proposed in this paper is studied
in the context of zero-sum games. In the author’s formulation, the generator is deemed the leader and the
discriminator as the follower. The idea is to allow the discriminator to take k individual gradient steps to
update its parameters, while the parameters of the generator are held fixed. The effect of ‘unrolling’ the dis-
criminator update for k steps is that a surrogate objective of f(x1, r2(x1)) arises for the generator, meaning
that the timescale-separation between the discriminator and the follower induces an update reminiscent of
that given for the leader in (2). In particular, when k → ∞ the follower converges to a local optimum as a
function of the generator’s parameters so thatD2f(x1, x2)→ 0. As a result, the critical points coincide with
the Stackelberg dynamics we study, indicating that unrolled GANs are converging only to Stackelberg equi-
libria. Empirically, GANs learned with such timescale separation procedures seem to outperform gradient
descent with uniform stepsizes [42], providing evidence Stackelberg equilibria are desirable in GANs.
This begs a further question of if attractors of the dynamics x˙ = −ω(x) are Stackelberg equilibria. The
first result shows that stable differential Nash are differential Stackelberg equilibria.
Proposition 2. Stable differential Nash equilibria in continuous zero-sum games are differential Stackelberg
equilibria. That is, given a zero-sum game (f,−f) defined by a sufficiently smooth function f ∈ Cq(X,R)
with q ≥ 2, a differential Nash equilibrium x∗ is a differential Stackelberg equilibrium.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary sufficiently smooth zero-sum game (f,−f) on continuous strategy spaces.
Suppose x is a stable differential Nash equilibrium so that by definition D21f(x) > 0, −D22f(x) > 0, and
J(x) =
[
D21f(x) D12f(x)
−D21f(x) −D22f(x)
]
> 0.
Then, the Schur complement of J(x) is also positive definite:
D21f(x)−D21f(x)>(D22f(x))−1D21f(x) > 0
Hence, x is a differential Stackelberg equilibrium since the Schur complement of J is exactly the derivative
D2f at critical points and −D22f(x) > 0 since x is a differential Nash equilibrium.
Remark 2. In the zero-sum setting, the fact that Nash equilibria are a subset of Stackelberg equilibria (or
minimax equilibria) for finite games is well-known [4]. We show the result for the notion of differential
Stackelberg equilibria for continuous action space games that we introduce. Similar to our work and con-
currently, Jin et al. [28] also show that local Nash equilibria are local minmax solutions for continuous
zero-sum games. It is interesting to point out that for a subclass of zero-sum continuous games with a
convex-concave structure for the leader’s cost the set of (differential) Nash and (differential) Stackelberg
equilibria coincide. Indeed, D21f(x) > 0 at critical points for convex-concave games, so that if x is a
differential Stackelberg equilibrium, it is also a Nash equilibrium.
This result indicates that recent works seeking Nash equilibria in GANs are seeking Stackelberg equi-
libria concurrently. However, in general, the procedures seeking Nash equilibria may not only converge
to a Stackelberg equilibrium. The following results indicate when a non-Nash attractor of the dynamics
x˙ = −ω(x) is an attractor of the Stackelberg dynamics x˙ = −ωS(x).
Let us start with a motivating question: when are non-Nash attractors of x˙ = −ω(x) differential Stack-
elberg equilibria? It was shown by Jin et al. [28] that not all attractors of x˙ = −ω(x) are local min-max
or local max-min equilibria since one can construct a function such that D21f(x) and −D22f(x) are both
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not positive definite but J(x) has positive eigenvalues. It appears to be much harder to characterize when a
non-Nash attractor of x˙ = −ω(x) is a differential Stackelberg equilibrium since being a differential Stack-
elberg equilibrium requires the follower’s individual Hessian to be positive definite. Indeed, it reduces to a
fundamental problem in linear algebra in which the relationship between the eigenvalues of the sum of two
matrices is largely unknown without assumptions on the structure of the matrices [30]. For a class of zero-
sum games, in what follows we provide some necessary and sufficient conditions for non-Nash attractors at
which the follower’s Hessian is positive definite.
Attracting critical points x∗ of the dynamics x˙ = −ω(x) that are non-Nash equilibria are such that either
D21f(x
∗) or −D22f(x∗) are not positive definite. Without loss of generality, considering player 1 to be the
leader, an attractor of the Stackelberg dynamics x˙ = −ωS(x) requires both −D22f(x∗) and D21f(x∗) −
D21f(x
∗)>(D22f)−1(x∗)D21f(x∗) to be positive definite. Hence, if −D22f(x∗) is not positive definite at a
non-Nash attractor of x˙ = −ω(x), then x∗ will also not be an attractor of x˙ = −ωS(x). A central question
is when can this occur zero-sum games? Towards answering this, let us consider the non-Nash attractors
with −D22f(x∗) > 0 and determine when the Schur complement above is positive definite, so that x∗ is an
attractor of x˙ = ωS(x).
In the following two propositions, we need some addition notion that is common across the two results.
Let x1 ∈ Rm and x2 ∈ Rn. For a non-Nash attractor x∗, let spec(D21f(x∗)) = {µj , j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}}
where
µ1 ≤ · · · ≤ µr < 0 ≤ µr+1 ≤ · · · ≤ µm,
and let spec(−D22f(x∗)) = {λi, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}} where
λ1 ≥ · · · ≥ λn > 0,
and define p = dim(ker(D21f(x
∗))).
Proposition 3 (Necessary conditions). Consider a non-Nash attractor x∗ of the individual gradient dy-
namics x˙ = −ω(x) such that −D22f(x∗) > 0. Given κ > 0 such that ‖D21f(x∗)‖ ≤ κ, if D21f(x∗) −
D21f(x
∗)>(D22f(x∗))−1D21f(x∗) > 0, then r ≤ n and κ2λi + µi > 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , r − p}.
Proposition 4 (Sufficient conditions). Let x∗ be a stable non-Nash attractor of the individual gradient
dynamics x˙ = −ω(x) such that D21f(x∗) and −D22f(x∗) are Hermitian, and −D22f(x∗) > 0. Suppose
that there exists a diagonal matrix (not necessarily positive) Σ ∈ Cm×n with non-zero entries such that
D12f(x
∗) = W1ΣW ∗2 where W1 are the orthonormal eigenvectors of D21f(x∗) and W2 are orthonormal
eigenvectors of −D22f(x∗). Given κ > 0 such that ‖D21f(x∗)‖ ≤ κ, if r ≤ n and κ2λi + µi > 0 for each
i ∈ {1, . . . , r − p}, then x∗ is a differential Stackelberg equilibrium and an attractor of x˙ = −ωS(x).
The proofs of the above results follow from some results linear algebra and are both in Appendix A.1.
Essentially, this says that if D21f(x
∗) = W1MW ∗1 with W1W ∗1 = In×n and M diagonal, and −D22f(x∗) =
W2ΛW
∗
2 withW2W
∗
2 = Im×m and Λ diagonal, thenD12f(x∗) can be written asW1ΣW ∗2 for some diagonal
matrix Σ ∈ Rn×m (not necessarily positive). Note that since Σ does not necessarily have positive values,
W1ΣW
∗
2 is not the singular value decomposition of D12f(x
∗). In turn, this means that the each eigenvector
ofD21f(x
∗) get mapped onto a single eigenvector of−D22f(x∗) through the transformationD12f(x∗) which
describes how player 1’s variation D1f(x) changes as a function of player 2’s choice. With this structure
for D12f(x∗), we can show that D21f(x∗)−D21f(x∗)>(D22f(x∗))−1D21f(x∗) > 0.
Note that if we remove the assumption that Σ have non-zero entries, then the remaining assumptions are
still sufficient to guarantee that
D21f(x
∗)−D21f(x∗)>(D22f)−1(x∗)D21f(x∗) ≥ 0.
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This means that x∗ does not satisfy the conditions for a differential Stackelberg, however, the point does
satisfy necessary conditions for a local Stackelberg equilibrium and the point is a marginally stable attractor
of the dynamics.
It is also worth noting that the fact that the eigenvalues of J(x∗) are in the open-left-half complex
plane is not used in proving this result. We believe that further investigation could lead to a less restrictive
sufficient condition. Empirically, by randomly generating the different block matrices, it is quite difficult
to find examples such that J(x∗) has positive eigenvalues, −D22f(x∗) > 0, and the Schur complement
D21f(x
∗)−D21f(x∗)>(D22f)−1(x∗)D21f(x∗) is not positive definite.
We also note that the condition depends on conditions that are difficult to check a priori without knowl-
edge of x∗. Certain classes of games for which these conditions hold everywhere and not just at the equilib-
rium can be constructed. For instance, alternative conditions can be given: if the function f which defines
the zero-sum game is such that it is concave in x2 and there exists a K such that
D12f(x) = KD
2
2f(x)
where supx ‖D12f(x)‖ ≤ κ < ∞3 and K = W1ΣW ∗2 with Σ again a (not necessarily positive) diagonal
matrix, then the results of Proposition 4 hold. From a control point of view, one can think about the leader’s
update as having a feedback term with the follower’s input. On the other hand, the results are useful for
the synthesis of games, such as in reward shaping or incentive design, where the goal is to drive agents to
particular desirable behavior.
This result implies that some of the non-Nash attractors of x˙ = −ω(x) are in fact Stackelberg equilibria
which, in the case of GANs, may be desirable equilibria as detailed earlier. Moreover, some very recent
results show that a number of approaches to training GANs are not converging to local minima (stable
Nash), but rather non-Nash attractors of the dynamics [8]. It would be interesting to characterize whether
or not the attractors satisfy the conditions we propose, and if such conditions could provide insights into
how to improve GAN training. This is a surprising result to some extent since recent works have proposed
schemes to avoid non-Nash attractors because they have been classified or viewed as being undesirable [37].
It further suggests that the techniques, which require strong coordination between players, may be relaxed
to require less coordination if Stackelberg are acceptable equilibria for the application.
One of the common assumptions in some of the recent GANs literature is that the discriminator net-
work is zero in a neighborhood of an equilibrium parameter configuration (see, e.g., [41, 43, 44]). This
assumption limits the theory to the ‘realizable’ case; the work by [43] provides relaxed assumptions for the
non-realizable case. In both cases, the Jacobian for the dynamics x˙ = −ω(x) is such that D21f(x∗) = 0.
Proposition 5. Consider a GAN satisfying the realizable assumption—that is, the discriminator network
is zero in a neighborhood of any equilibrium. Then, an attractor for the simultaneous gradient dynamics
x˙ = −ω(x) at which −D22f is positive semi-definite satisfies necessary conditions for a local Stackelberg
equilibrium, and it will be a marginally stable point of the Stackelberg dynamics x˙ = −ωS(x).
Proof. Consider an attractor x∗ of x˙ = −ω(x) such that −D22f(x∗) ≥ 0. Note that the realizable
assumption implies that the Jacobian of ω is
J(x) =
[
0 D12f(x)
−D21f(x) −D22f(x)
]
(see, e.g., [43]). Hence, since −D22f(x) ≥ 0,
−D>21f(x∗)(D22f)−1(x∗)D21f(x∗) ≥ 0.
3. Functions such that derivative of f is Lipschitz will satisfy this condition.
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Since x∗ is an attractor, D1f(x∗) = 0 and D2f(x∗) = 0 so that
Df(x∗) = D1f(x∗) +D2f(x∗)(D22f)
−1(x∗)D21f(x∗) = 0
Consequently, the necessary conditions for a local Stackelberg equilibrium are satisfied. Moreover, since
both −D22f(x∗) ≥ 0 and the Schur complement −D>21f(x∗)(D22)−1f(x∗)D21f(x∗) ≥ 0, the Jacobian of
ωS is positive semi-definite so that the point x∗ is marginally stable.
Now, simply satisfying the necessary conditions is not enough to guarantee that attractors of the simul-
taneous play gradient dynamics will be a local Stackelberg equilibrium. We can state sufficient conditions
by examining Proposition 4.
Proposition 6. Consider a GAN satisfying the realizable assumption—that is, the discriminator network
is zero in a neighborhood of any equilibrium—and an attractor for the simultaneous gradient dynamics
x˙ = −ω(x) at which−D22f is positive definite. Suppose that there exists a diagonal matrix Σ with non-zero
entries such that D12f(x∗) = ΣW where W are the orthonormal eigenvectors of −D22f(x∗). Then, x∗ is a
differential Stackelberg equilibrium and an attractor of x˙ = −ωS(x).
The proof follows directly from Proposition 4 and Proposition 5. It is not directly clear how restrictive
these sufficient conditions are for GANs. We leave this for future inquiry.
2.2.2 Connections to Opponent Shaping
Beyond the work in zero-sum games and applications to GANs, there has also been recent work, which we
will refer to as ‘opponent shaping’, where one or more players takes into account its opponents’ response to
their action [21, 33, 59]. The initial work of Foerster et al. [21] bears the most resemblance to the learning
algorithms studied in this paper. The update rule (LOLA) considered there (in the deterministic setting with
constant stepsizes) takes the following form:
x+1 = x1 − γ1(D1f1(x)− γ2D2f1(x)D21f2(x))
x+2 = x2 − γ2D2f2(x)
The attractors of these dynamics are not necessarily Nash equilibria nor are they Stackelberg equilibria as
can be seen by looking at the critical points of the dynamics. Indeed, the LOLA dynamics lead only to
Nash or non-Nash stable attractors of the limiting dynamics. The effect of the additional ‘look-ahead’ term
is simply that it changes the vector field and region of attraction for stable critical points. In the zero-sum
case, however, the critical points of the above are the same as those of simultaneous play individual gradient
updates, yet the Jacobian is not the same and it is still possible to converge to a non-Nash attractor.
With a few modifications, the above update rule can be massaged into a form which more closely resem-
bles the hierarchical learning rules we study in this paper. In particular, if instead of γ2, player 2 employed
a Newton stepsize of (D22f2)
−1, then the update would look like
x+1 = x1 − γ1(D1f1(x)−D2f1(x)(D22f2)−1(x)D21f2(x))
x+2 = x2 − γ2D2f2(x)
which resembles a deterministic version of (1). The critical points of this update coincide with the critical
points of a Stackelberg game (f1, f2). With appropriately chosen stepsizes and with an initialization in a
region on which the implicit map, which defines the −(D22f2)−1(x)D21f2(x) component of the update, is
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well-defined uniformly in x1, the above dynamics will converge to Stackelberg equilibria. In this paper, we
provide an in-depth convergence analysis and for the stochastic setting4 of the above update.
2.2.3 Comparing Nash and Stackelberg Equilibrium Cost
We have alluded to the idea that the ability to act first gives the leader a distinct advantage over the follower
in a hierarchical game. We now formalize this statement with a known result that compares the cost of the
leader at Nash and Stackelberg equilibrium.
Proposition 7. ([4, Proposition 4.4]). Consider an arbitrary sufficiently smooth two-player general-sum
game (f1, f2) on continuous strategy spaces. Let fN1 denote the infimum of all Nash equilibrium costs for
player 1 and fS1 denote an arbitrary Stackelberg equilibrium cost for player 1. Then, ifR(x1) is a singleton
for every x1 ∈ X1, fS1 ≤ fN1 .
This result says that the leader never favors the simultaneous play game over the hierarchical play game
in two-player general-sum games with unique follower responses. On the other hand, the follower may or
may not prefer the simultaneous play game over the hierarchical play game.
The fact that under certain conditions the leader can obtain lower cost under a Stackelberg equilibrium
compared to any of the Nash equilibrium may provide further explanation for the success of the methods
in [42]. Commonly, the discriminator can overpower the generator when training a GAN [42] and giving the
generator an advantage may mitigate this problem. In the context of multi-agent learning, the advantage of
the leader in hierarchical games leads to the question of how the roles of each player in a game are decided.
While we do not focus on this question, it is worth noting that when each player mutually benefits from
the leadership of a player the solution is called concurrent and when each player prefers to be the leader
the solution is called non-concurrent. We believe that exploring classes of games in which each solution
concept arises is an interesting direction of future work.
3. Convergence Analysis
Following the preceding discussion, consider the learning rule for each player to be given by
xi,k+1 = xi,k − γi,k(ωS,i(xk) + wi,k+1), (5)
where recall that ωS = (Df1(x), D2f2(x)). Moreover, for each i ∈ I, {γi,k} is the sequence of learning
rates and {wi,k} is the noise process for player i. As before, suppose player 1 is the leader and conjectures
that player 2 updates its action x2 in each round via r(x1). This setting captures the scenario in which
players do not have oracle access to their gradients, but do have an unbiased estimator. As an example,
players could be performing policy gradient reinforcement learning or alternative gradient-based learning
schemes. Let dim(Xi) = di for each i ∈ I and d = d1 + d2.
Assumption 1. The following hold:
A1a. The maps Df1 : Rd → Rd1 , D2f2 : Rd → Rd2 are L1, L2 Lipschitz, and ‖Df1‖ ≤M1 <∞.
A1b. For each i ∈ I, the learning rates satisfy∑k γi,k =∞,∑k γ2i,k <∞.
A1c. The noise processes {wi,k} are zero mean, martingale difference sequences. That is, given the filtration
Fk = σ(xs, w1,s, w2,s, s ≤ k), {wi,k}i∈I are conditionally independent, E[wi,k+1| Fk] = 0 a.s., and
E[‖wi,k+1‖| Fk] ≤ ci(1 + ‖xk‖) a.s. for some constants ci ≥ 0, i ∈ I.
4. In [21], the authors do not provide convergence analysis; they do in their extension, yet only for constant and uniform stepsizes
and for a learning rule that is different than the one studied in this paper as all players are conjecturing about the behavior of
their opponents. This distinguishes the present work from their setting.
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Before diving into the convergence analysis, we need some machinery from dynamical systems theory.
Consider the dynamics from (5) written as a continuous time combined system ξ˙t = F (ξt) where ξt(z) =
ξ(t, z) is a continuous map and ξ = {ξt}t∈R is the flow of F . A set A is said to be invariant under the
flow ξ if for all t ∈ R, ξt(A) ⊂ A, in which case ξ|A denotes the semi-flow. A point x is an equilibrium
if ξt(x) = x for all t and, of course, when ξ is induced by F , equilibria coincide with critical points of F .
Let X be a topological metric space with metric ρ, an example being X = Rd endowed with the Euclidean
distance.
Definition 5. A nonempty invariant set A ⊂ X for ξ is said to be internally chain transitive if for any
a, b ∈ A and δ > 0, T > 0, there exists a finite sequence {x1 = a, x2, . . . , xk−1, xk = b; t1, . . . , tk−1} with
xi ∈ A and ti ≥ T , 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, such that ρ(ξti(xi), xi+1) < δ, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1.
3.1 Learning Stackelberg Solutions for the Leader
Suppose that the leader (player 1) operates under the assumption that the follower (player 2) is playing a local
optimum in each round. That is, given x1,k, x2,k+1 ∈ arg minx2 f2(x1,k, x2) for which D2f2(x1,k, x2) = 0
is a first-order local optimality condition. If, for a given (x1, x2) ∈ X1×X2, D22f2(x1, x2) is invertible and
D2f2(x1, x2) = 0, then the implicit function theorem implies that there exists neighborhoods U ⊂ X1 and
V ⊂ X2 and a smooth map r : U → V such that r(x1) = x2.
Assumption 2. For every x1, x˙2 = −D2f2(x1, x2) has a globally asymptotically stable equilibrium r(x1)
uniformly in x1 and r : Rd1 → Rd2 is Lr–Lipschitz.
Consider the leader’s learning rule
x1,k+1 = x1,k − γ1,k(Df1(x1,k, x2,k) + w1,k+1) (6)
where x2,k is defined via the map r2 defined implicitly in a neighborhood of (x1,k, x2,k).
Proposition 8. Suppose that for each x ∈ X , D22f2 is non-degenerate and Assumption 1 holds for i = 1.
Then, x1,k converges almost surely to an (possibly sample path dependent) equilibrium point x∗1 which is
a local Stackelberg solution for the leader. Moreover, if Assumption 1 holds for i = 2 and Assumption 2
holds, then x2,k → x∗2 = r(x∗1) so that (x∗1, x∗2) is a differential Stackelberg equilibrium.
Proof. This proof follows primarily from using known stochastic approximation results. The update rule
in (6) is a stochastic approximation of x˙1 = −Df1(x1, x2) and consequently is expected to track this ODE
asymptotically. The main idea behind the analysis is to construct a continuous interpolated trajectory x¯(t)
for t ≥ 0 and show it asymptotically almost surely approaches the solution set to the ODE. Under Assump-
tions 1–3, results from [11, §2.1] imply that the sequence generated from (6) converges almost surely to a
compact internally chain transitive set of x˙1 = −Df1(x1, x2). Furthermore, it can be observed that the only
internally chain transitive invariant sets of the dynamics are differential Stackelberg equilibria since at any
stable attractor of the dynamics D2f1(x1, r(x1)) > 0 and from assumption D22f2(x1, r(x1)) > 0. Finally,
from [11, §2.2], we can conclude that the update from (6) almost surely converges to a possibly sample path
dependent equilibrium point since the only internally chain transitive invariant sets for x˙1 = −Df1(x1, x2)
are equilibria. The final claim that x2,k → r(x∗1) is guaranteed since r is Lipschitz and x1,k → x∗1.
The above result can be stated with a relaxed version of Assumption 2.
Corollary 1. Given a differential Stackelberg equilibrium x∗ = (x∗1, x∗2), let Bq(x∗) = Bq1(x∗1)×Bq2(x∗2)
for some q1, q2 > 0 on which D22f2 is non-degenerate. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds for i = 1 and that
x1,0 ∈ Bq1(x∗1). Then, x1,k converges almost surely to x∗1. Moreover, if Assumption 1 holds for i = 2, r(x1)
is a locally asymptotically stable equilibrium uniformly in x1 on the ball Bq2(x
∗
2), and x2,0 ∈ Bq2(x∗2), then
x2,k → x∗2 = r(x∗1).
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The proof follows the same arguments as the proof of Proposition 8.
3.2 Learning Stackelberg Equilibria: Two-Timescale Analysis
Now, let us consider the case where the leader again operates under the assumption that the follower is
playing (locally) optimally at each round so that the belief is D2f2(x1,k, x2,k) = 0, but the follower is
actually performing the update x2,k+1 = x2,k + g2(x1,k, x2,k) where g2 ≡ −γ2,kE[D2f2]. The learning
dynamics in this setting are then
x1,k+1 = x1,k − γ1,k(Df1(xk) + w1,k+1) (7)
x2,k+1 = x2,k − γ2,k(D2f2(xk) + w2,k+1) (8)
where Df1(x) = D1f1(x) + D2f1(x)Dr(x1). Suppose that γ1,k → 0 faster than γ2,k so that in the limit
τ → 0, the above approximates the singularly perturbed system defined by
x˙1(t) = −τDf1(x1(t), x2(t))
x˙2(t) = −D2f2(x1(t), x2(t)) (9)
The learning rates can be seen as stepsizes in a discretization scheme for solving the above dynamics. The
condition that γ1,k = o(γ2,k) induces a timescale separation in which x2 evolves on a faster timescale
than x1. That is, the fast transient player is the follower and the slow component is the leader since
limk→∞ γ1,k/γ2,k = 0 implies that from the perspective of the follower, x1 appears quasi-static and from
the perspective of the leader, x2 appears to have equilibriated, meaning D2f2(x1, x2) = 0 given x1. From
this point of view, the learning dynamics (7)–(8) approximate the dynamics in the preceding section. More-
over, stable attractors of the dynamics are such that the leader is at a local optima for f1, not just along
its coordinate axis but in both coordinates (x1, x2) constrained to the manifold r(x1); this is to make a
distinction between differential Nash equilibria in agents are at local optima aligned with their individual
coordinate axes.
3.2.1 Asymptotic Almost Sure Convergence
The following two results are fairly classical results in stochastic approximation. They are leveraged here to
making conclusions about convergence to Stackelberg equilibria in hierarchical learning settings.
While we do not need the following assumption for all the results in this section, it is required for
asymptotic convergence of the two-timescale process in (7)–(8).
Assumption 3. The dynamics x˙1 = −Df1(x1, r(x1)) have a globally asymptotically stable equilibrium.
Under Assumption 1–3, and the assumption that γ1,k = o(γ2,k), classical results imply that the dy-
namics (7)–(8) converge almost surely to a compact internally chain transitive set T of (9); see, e.g., [11,
§6.1-2], [10, §3.3]. Furthermore, it is straightforward to see that stable differential Nash equilibria are inter-
nally chain transitive sets since they are stable attractors of the dynamics ξ˙t = F (ξt) from (9).
Remark 3. There are two important points to remark on at this juncture. First, the flow of the dynamics
(9) is not necessarily a gradient flow, meaning that the dynamics may admit non-equilibrium attractors such
as periodic orbits. The dynamics correspond to a gradient vector field if and only if D2(Df1) ≡ D12f2,
meaning when the dynamics admit a potential function. Equilibria may also not be isolated unless the
Jacobian of ωS , say JS , is non-degenerate at the points. Second, except in the case of zero-sum settings in
which (f1, f2) = (f,−f), non-Stackelberg locally asymptotically stable equilibria are attractors. That is,
convergence does not imply that the players have settled on a Stackelberg equilibrium, and this can occur
even if the dynamics admit a potential.
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Let tk =
∑k−1
l=0 γ1,l be the (continuous) time accumulated after k samples of the slow component x1.
Define ξ1,s(t) to be the flow of x˙1 = −Df1(x1(t), r(x1(t))) starting at time s from intialization xs.
Proposition 9. Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then, conditioning on the event {supk
∑
i ‖xi,k‖2 <
∞}, for any integer K > 0, limk→∞ sup0≤h≤K ‖x1,k+h − ξ1,tk(tk+h)‖2 = 0 almost surely.
Proof. The proof follows standard arguments in stochastic approximation. We simply provide a sketch here
to give some intuition. First, we show that conditioned on the event {supk
∑
i ‖x1,k‖2 <∞}, (x1,k, x2,k)→
{(x1, r(x1))| x1 ∈ Rd1} almost surely. Let ζk = γ1,kγ2,k (Df1(xk) + w1,k+1). Hence the leader’s sample path
is generated by x1,k+1 = x1,k − γ2,kζk which tracks x˙1 = 0 since ζk = o(1) so that it is asymptotically
negligible. In particular, (x1,k, x2,k) tracks (x˙1 = 0, x˙2 = −D2f2(x1, x2)). That is, on intervals [tˆj , tˆj+1]
where tˆj =
∑j−1
l=0 γ2,l, the norm difference between interpolated trajectories of the sample paths and the
trajectories of (x˙1 = 0, x˙2 = −D2f2(x1, x2)) vanishes a.s. as k →∞. Since the leader is tracking x˙1 = 0,
the follower can be viewed as tracking x˙2(t) = −D2f2(x1, x2(t)). Then applying Lemma 4 provided in
Appendix A, limk→0 ‖x2,k − r(x1,k)‖ → 0 almost surely.
Now, by Assumption 1, Df1 is Lipschitz and bounded (in fact, independent of A1a., since Df1 ∈ Cq,
q ≥ 2, it is locally Lipschtiz and, on the event {supk
∑
i ‖xi,k‖2 <∞}, it is bounded). In turn, it induces a
continuous globally integrable vector field, and therefore satisfies the assumptions of Benaı¨m [6, Prop. 4.1].
Moreover, under Assumptions A1b. and A1c., the assumptions of Benaı¨m [6, Prop. 4.2] are satisfied, which
gives the desired result.
Corollary 2. Under Assumption 3 and the assumptions of Proposition 9, (x1,k, x2,k)→ (x∗1, r(x∗1)) almost
surely conditioned on the event {supk
∑
i ‖xi,k‖2 < ∞}. That is, the learning dynamics (7)–(8) converge
to stable attractors of (9), the set of which includes the stable differential Stackelberg equilibria.
Proof. Continuing with the conclusion of the proof of Proposition 9, on intervals [tk, tk+1] the norm
difference between interpolates of the sample path and the trajectories of x˙1 = −Df1(x1, r(x1)) vanish
asymptotically; applying Lemma 4 (Appendix A) gives the result.
Leveraging the results in Section 2.2.1, the convergence guarantees are stronger since in zero-sum settings
all attractors are Stackelberg; this contrasts with the Nash equilibrium concept.
Corollary 3. Consider a zero-sum setting (f,−f). Under the assumptions of Proposition 9 and Assump-
tion 3, conditioning on the event {supk
∑
i ‖xi,k‖2 < ∞}, the learning dynamics (7)–(8) converge to a
differential Stackelberg equilibria almost surely.
The proof of this corollary follows the above analysis and invokes Proposition 1.
Remark 4. As with Corollary 1, we can relax Assumption 2 and 3 to local asymptotical stability assump-
tions. In this case, again we would need to assume only that for a given ball Bq(x∗) = Bq1(x∗1)×Bq2(x∗2)
around a differential Nash equilibrium x∗, the dynamics x˙2 = −D2f2(x) have a locally asymptotically
stable attractor r(x1) uniformly in x1 on Bq2(x
∗
2), the dynamics x˙1 = Df1(x1, r(x1)) have a locally
asymptotically stable attractor on Bq1(x1), and that x0 ∈ Bq(x∗).
3.2.2 Finite-Time High-Probability Guarantees
While asymptotic guarantees of the proceeding section are useful, high-probability finite-time guarantees
can be leveraged more directly in analysis and synthesis, e.g., of mechanisms to coordinate otherwise au-
tonomous agents. In this section, we aim to provide concentration bounds for the purpose of deriving
convergence rate and error bounds in support of this objective. The results in this section follow the very
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recent work by Borkar and Pattathil [12]. We highlight key differences and, in particular, where the analysis
may lead to insights relevant for learning in hierarchical decision problems between non-cooperative agents.
Consider a locally asymptotically stable differential Stackelberg equilibrium x∗ = (x∗1, r(x∗1)) ∈ X and
let Bq0(x
∗) be an q0 > 0 radius ball around x∗ contained in the region of attraction. Stability implies that
the Jacobian JS(x∗1, r(x∗1)) is positive definite and by the converse Lyapunov theorem [54, Chap. 5] there
exists local Lyapunov functions for the dynamics x˙1(t) = −τDf1(x1(t), r(x1(t))) and for the dynamics
x˙2(t) = −D2f2(x1, x2(t)), for each fixed x1. In particular, there exists a local Lyapunov function V ∈
C1(Rd1) with lim‖x1‖↑∞ V (x1) = ∞, and 〈∇V (x1), Df1(x1, r(x1))〉 < 0 for x1 6= x∗1. For q > 0, let
V q = {x ∈ dom(V ) : V (x) ≤ q}. Then, there is also q > q0 > 0 and 0 > 0 such that for  < 0,
{x1 ∈ Rd1 | ‖x1 − x∗1‖ ≤ } ⊆ V q0 ⊂ N0(V q0) ⊆ V q ⊂ dom(V ) where N0(V q0) = {x ∈ Rd1 | ∃x′ ∈
V q0 s.t.‖x′ − x‖ ≤ 0}. An analogously defined V˜ exists for the dynamics x˙2 for each fixed x1.
For now, fix n0 sufficiently large; we specify the values of n0 for which the theory holds before the
statement of Theorem 1. Define the event En = {x¯2(t) ∈ V q ∀t ∈ [t˜n0 , t˜n]} where x¯2(t) = x2,k +
t−t˜k
γ2,k
(x2,k+1−x2,k) are linear interpolates—i.e., asymptotic pseudo-trajectories—defined for t ∈ (t˜k, t˜k+1)
with t˜k+1 = t˜k + γ2,k and t˜0 = 0.
The basic idea of the proof is to leverage Alekseev’s formula (Thm. 3, Appendix A) to bound the
difference between the asymptotic pseudo-trajectories and the flow of the corresponding limiting differential
equation on each continuous time interval between each of the successive iterates k and k+ 1 by sequences
of constants that decay asymptotically. Then, a union bound is used over all time intervals after defined for
n ≥ n0 in order to construct a concentration bound. This is done first for the follower, showing that x2,k
tracks the leader’s ’conjecture’ or belief r(x1,k) about the follower’s reaction, and then for the leader.
Following Borkar and Pattathil [12], we can express the linear interpolates for any n ≥ n0 as x¯2(t˜n+1) =
x¯2(t˜n0)−
∑n
k=n0
γ2,k(D2f2(xk) +w2,k+1) where γ2,kD2f2(xk) =
∫ t˜k+1
t˜k
D2f2(x1,k, x¯2(t˜k)) ds and simi-
larly for the w2,k+1 term. Adding and subtracting
∫ t˜n+1
t˜n0
D2f2(x1(s), x¯2(s)) ds, Alekseev’s formula can be
applied to get
x¯2(t) = x2(t) + Φ2(t, s, x1(t˜n0), x¯2(t˜n0))(x¯2(t˜n0)− x2(t˜n0)) +
∫ t
t˜n0
Φ2(t, s, x1(s), x¯2(s))ζ2(s) ds
where x1(t) ≡ x1 is constant (since x˙1 = 0), x2(t) = r(x1), and
ζ2(s) = −D2f2(x1(t˜k), x¯2(t˜k)) +D2f2(x1(s), x¯2(s)) + w2,k+1.
In addition, for t ≥ s, Φ2(·) satisfies linear system
Φ˙2(t, s, x0) = J2(x1(t), x2(t))Φ2(t, s, x0),
with Φ2(t, s, x0) = I and x0 = (x1,0, x2,0) and where J2 the Jacobian of −D2f2(x1, ·). We provide more
detail on this derivation in Appendix B.
Given that x∗ = (x∗1, r(x∗1)) is a stable differential Stackelberg equilibrium, J2(x∗) is positive definite.
Hence, as in [56, Lem. 5.3], we can find M , κ2 > 0 such that for t ≥ s, x2,0 ∈ V q, ‖Φ2(t, s, x1,0, x2,0)‖ ≤
Me−κ2(t−s); this result follows from standard results on stability of linear systems (see, e.g., Callier and
Desoer [14, §7.2, Thm. 33]) along with a bound on∫ t
s
∥∥D22f2(x1, x2(τ, s, x˜0))−D22f2(x∗)∥∥dτ
for x˜0 ∈ V q (see, e.g., Thoppe and Borkar [56, Lem 5.2]).
Now, an interesting point worth making is that this analysis leads to a very nice result for the leader-
follower setting. In particular, through the use of the auxiliary variable z, we can show that the follower’s
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sample path ‘tracks’ the leader’s conjectured sample path. Indeed, consider zk = r(x1,k), that is, where
D2f2(x1,k, x2,k) = 0. Then, using a Taylor expansion of the implicitly defined conjecture r, we get zk+1 =
zk +Dr(x1,k)(x1,k+1 − x1,k) + δk+1 where ‖δk+1‖ ≤ Lr‖x1,k+1 − x1,k‖2 is the error from the remainder
terms. Plugging in x1,k+1,
zk+1 = zk + γ2,k(−D2f2(x1,k, zk) + τkDr2(x1,k)(w1,k+1 −Df1(x1,k, x2,k)) + γ−12,kδk+1).
The terms after −D2f2 are o(1), and hence asymptotically negligible, so that this z sequence tracks dynam-
ics as x2,k. We show that with high probability, they asymptotically contract, leading to the conclusion that
the follower’s dynamics track the leader’s conjecture.
Towards this end, we first bound the normed difference between x2,k and zk. Define constants
Hn0 = (‖x¯2(t˜n0 − x2(t˜n0)‖+ ‖z¯(t˜n0)− x2(t˜n0)‖),
and
S2,n =
∑n−1
k=n0
( ∫ t˜k+1
t˜k
Φ2(t˜n, s, x1(t˜k), x¯2(t˜k))ds)w2,k+1,
and let τk = γ1,k/γ2,k.
Lemma 1. For any n ≥ n0, there exists K > 0 such that conditioned on En,
‖x2,n − zn‖ ≤ K
(‖S2,n‖+ e−κ2(t˜n−t˜n0 )Hn0 + supn0≤k≤n−1 γ2,k + supn0≤k≤n−1 γ2,k‖w2,k+1‖2
+ supn0≤k≤n−1 τk + supn0≤k≤n−1 τk‖w1,k+1‖2
)
.
Using this bound, we can provide an asymptotic guarantee that x2,k tracks r(x1,k) and a high-probability
guarantee that x2,k gets locked in to a ball around r(x∗1). Fix ε ∈ [0, 1) and let N be such that γ2,n ≤
ε/(8K), τn ≤ ε/(8K) for all n ≥ N . Let n0 ≥ N and with K as in Lemma 1, let T be such that
e−κ2(t˜n−t˜n0 )Hn0 ≤ ε/(8K) for all n ≥ n0 + T .
Theorem 1. Suppose that Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 hold and let γ1,k = o(γ2,k). Given a stable differential
Stackelberg equilibrium x∗ = (x∗1, r(x∗1)), the follower’s sample path generated by (8) with asymptotically
track the leader’s conjecture zk = r(x1,k) and, given ε ∈ [0, 1), will get ‘locked in’ to a ε–neighborhood
with high probability conditioned on reaching Bq0(x
∗) by iteration n0. That is, letting n¯ = n0 + T + 1, for
some C1, C2, C3, C4 > 0,
P(‖x2,n − zn‖ ≤ ε,∀n ≥ n¯|x2,n0 , zn0 ∈ Bq0)
≥ 1−∑∞n=n0 C1e−C2√ε/γ2,n −∑∞n=n0 C2e−C2√ε/τn −∑∞n=n0 C3e−C4ε2/βn .
(10)
with βn = maxn0≤k≤n−1 e
−κ2(
∑n−1
i=k+1 γ2,i)γ2,k.
The key technique in proving the above theorem (which is done in detail in Borkar and Pattathil [12]
using results from Thoppe and Borkar [56]), is taking a union bound of the errors over all the continuous
time intervals defined for n ≥ n0.
The above theorem can be restated to give a guarantee on getting locked-in to an ε-neighborhood of a
stable differenital Stackelberg equilibria x∗ if the learning processes are initialized in Bq0(x∗).
Corollary 4. Fix ε ∈ [0, 1) and suppose that γ2,n ≤ ε/(8K) for all n ≥ 0. With K as in Lemma 1, let
T be such that e−κ2(t˜n−t˜0)H0 ≤ ε/(8K) for all n ≥ T . Under the assumptions of Theorem 1, x2,k will
will get ‘locked in’ to a ε–neighborhood with high probability conditioned on x0 ∈ Bq0(x∗) where the
high-probability bound is given in (10) with n0 = 0.
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Given that the follower’s action x2,k tracks r(x1,k), we can also show that x1,k gets locked into an ε–
neighborhood of x∗1 after a finite time with high probability. First, a similar bound as in Lemma 1 can be
constructed for x1,k.
Define the event Eˆn = {x¯1(t) ∈ V q ∀t ∈ [tˆn0 , tˆn]} where for each t, x¯1(t) = x1,k+ t−tˆkγ1,k (x1,k+1−x1,k)
is a linear interpolates between the samples {x1,k}, tˆk+1 = tˆk+γ1,k, and tˆ0 = 0. Then as above, Alekseev’s
formula can again be applied to get
x¯1(t) = x1(t, tˆn0 , y(tˆn0)) + Φ1(t, tˆn0 , x¯1(tˆn0))(x¯1(tˆn0)− x1(tˆn0)) +
∫ t
tˆn0
Φ1(t, s, x¯1(s))ζ1(s) ds
where x1(t) ≡ x∗1,
ζ1(s) = Df1(x1,k, r(x1,k))−Df1(x¯1(s), r(x¯1(s))) +Df1(xk)−Df1(x1,k, r(x1,k)) + w1,k+1,
and Φ1 is the solution to a linear system with dynamics J1(x∗1, r(x∗1)), the Jacobian of −Df1(·, r(·)), and
with initial data Φ1(s, s, x1,0) = I . This linear system, as above, has bound ‖Φ1(t, s, x1,0)‖ ≤ M1eκ1(t−1)
for some M1, κ1 > 0. Define S1,n =
∑n−1
k=n0
∫ tˆk+1
tˆk
Φ1(tˆn, s, x¯1(tˆk))ds · w1,k+1.
Lemma 2. For any n ≥ n0, there exists K¯ > 0 such that conditioned on E˜n,
‖x¯1(tˆn)− x1(tˆn)‖ ≤K¯
(‖S1,n‖+ supn0≤k≤n−1 ‖S2,k‖+ supn0≤k≤n−1 γ2,k + supn0≤k≤n−1 τk
+ supn0≤k≤n−1 γ2,k‖w2,k+1‖2 + supn0≤k≤n−1 τk‖w1,k+1‖2 + supn0≤k≤n−1 τkHn0
+ eκ1(tˆn−tˆn0 )‖x¯1(tˆn0)− x1(tˆn0)‖
)
.
Using this lemma, we can get the desired guarantees on x1,k. Indeed, as above, fix ε ∈ (0, 1] and let
N be such that γ2,n ≤ ε/(8K), τn ≤ ε/(8K), ∀ n ≥ N . Then, for any n0 ≥ N and K as in Lemma 1,
let T be such that e−κ2(t˜n−t˜n0 )Hn0 ≤ ε/(8K), ∀ n ≥ n0 + T . Moreover, with K¯ as in Lemma 2, let
e−κ1(tˆn−tˆn0 )(‖x¯1(tˆn0)− x1(tˆn0)‖ ≤ ε/(8K¯), ∀n ≥ n0 + T .
Theorem 2. Suppose that Assumptions 1–3 hold and that γ1,k = o(γ2,k). Given a stable differential Stack-
elberg equilibrium x∗ and ε ∈ [0, 1), xk will get ‘locked in’ to a ε-neighborhood of x∗ with high probability
conditioned reaching Bq0(x
∗) by iteration n0. That is, letting n¯ = n0 + T + 1, for some constants C˜j > 0,
j ∈ {1, . . . , 6},
P(‖x1,n − x1(tˆn)‖ ≤ ε,∀n ≥ n¯|xn0 , xn0 ∈ Bq0)
≥ 1 +∑∞n=n0 C˜1e−C˜2√ε/√γ2,n −∑∞n=n0 C˜1e−C˜2√ε/√τn
−∑∞n=n0 C˜3e−C˜4ε2/βn −∑∞n=n0 C˜5e−C˜6ε2/ηn (11)
with ηn = maxn0≤k≤n−1
(
e−κ1(
∑n−1
i=k+1 γ1,i)γ1,k
)
.
An analogous corollary to Corollary 4 can be stated for x1,k with n0 = 0; we do not present it to save
space.
4. Numerical Examples
In this section, we show numerical examples to validate our theory.
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Figure 1: (a) Firms’ Production. Sample learning paths for each firm showing the production evolution and conver-
gence to the Nash equilibrium under the Nash dynamics (i.e., simultaneous gradient-based learning using players’
individual gradients with respect to their own choice variable) and convergence to the Stackelberg equilibrium under
the Stackelberg dynamics. (b) Firms’ Profit. Evolution of each firm’s profit under the learning dynamics for both Nash
and Stackelberg. Similar convergence characteristics can be observed in (a) and (b). Of note is the improved profit
obtained by the leader in the Stackelberg equilibrium compared to the Nash equilibrium.
4.1 Stackelberg Duopoly
In Cournot’s duopoly model a single good is produced by two firms so that the industry is a duopoly. The
cost for firm i = 1, 2 for producing qi units of the good is given by ciqi where ci > 0 is the unit cost. The total
output of the firms is Q = q1 + q2. The market price is P = A−Q when A ≥ Q and P = 0 when A < Q.
We can assume that A > ci for i = 1, 2. The profit of each firm is pii = Pqi− ciqi = (A− qi− q−i− ci)qi.
Moreover, the unique Nash equilibrium in the game is q∗i =
1
3(A + c−i − 2ci) so that the market price is
P ∗ = 13(A+ ci + c−i) and each firm obtains a profit of pi
∗
i =
1
9(A− 2ci + c−i)2.
In the Stackelberg duopoly model with two firms, there is a leader and a follower. The leader moves
and then the follower produces a best response to the action of the leader. Knowing this, the leader seeks
to maximize profit taking advantage of the power to move before the follower. The unique Stackelberg
equilibrium in the game is q∗1 =
1
2(A+ c2 − 2c1), q∗2 = 14(A+ 2c1 − 3c2). In equilibrium the market price
is P ∗ = 14(A + 2c1 + c2), the profit of the leader is pi
∗
1 =
1
8(A − 2c1 + c2)2, and the profit of the follower
is pi∗2 =
1
16(A+ 2c1 − 3c2)2.
The key point we want to highlight is that in this game, firm 1’s (leader) profit is always higher in the
hierarchical play game than the simultaneous play game. We also use it as a simple validation example for
our theory. For this problem, we simulate the Nash gradient dynamics and our two-timescale algorithm for
learning Stackelberg equilibria to illustrate the distinctions between the Cournot and Stackelberg duopoly
models. In this simulation, we select a decaying step-size of γi,k = 1/k for each player in the Nash gradient
dynamics. The decaying step-size is chosen to be γ1,k = 1/k for the leader and γ2,k = 1/k2/3 for the
follower in the Stackelberg two-timescale algorithm so that the leader moves on a slower timescale than
the follower as required. The noise at each update step is drawn as wi,k ∼ N (0, 10) for each firm. The
parameters of the example are selected to be A = 100, c1 = 5, c2 = 2. In Figure 1 we show the results
of the simulation. Figure 1a shows the production path of each firm and Figure 1b shows the profit path
of each firm. Under the Nash gradient dynamics, the firms converge to the unique Nash equilibrium of
q∗N = (30.67, 33.67) that gives profit of pi
∗
N = (944.4, 1114.7). The Stacklberg procedure converges to
the unique Stackelberg equilibrium of q∗S = (46, 26) that gives profit of pi
∗
S = (1048.2, 659.9). Hence as
expected the two-timescale procedure converges to the Stackelberg equilibrium and gives the leader higher
profit than under the Nash equilibrium.
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Figure 2: (a-b) Sample learning paths for each player showing the positions and convergence to local Nash equilibria
under the Nash dynamics and convergence to local Stackelberg equilibria under the Stackelberg dynamics. The value
of player 1’s choice variable θ1 is shown on the horizontal axis and the value of player 2’s choice variable θ2 is shown
on the vertical axis. Note that the square depicts the unfolded torus where horizontal edges are equivalent, vertical
edges are equivalent, and the corners are all equivalent. The black lines show D1f1 in (a) and Df1 in (b) where the
white lines show D2f2 in both (a) and (b). (c-d) Position and cost paths for each player for a sampled initial condition
under the Nash and Stackelberg dynamics.
4.2 Location Game on Torus
In this section, we examine a two-player game in which each player is selecting a position on a torus.
Precisely, each player has a choice variable θi that can be chosen in the interval [−pi, pi]. The cost for each
player is defined as fi(θi, θ−i) = −αi cos(θi−φi)+cos(θi−θ−i), where each φi and αi are constants. The
cost function is such that each player must trade-off being close to φi and far from θ−i. For the simulation
of this game, we select the parameters α = (1.0, 1.3) and φ = (pi/8, pi/8). There are multiple Nash and
Stackelberg equilibria under these parameters. Each equilibrium is a stable equilibrium in this example.
The Nash equilbria are θ∗N = (−0.78, 1.18) and θ∗N = (1.57,−0.4), and the costs are each f(θ∗N ) =
(−0.77,−1.3) and f(θ∗N ) = (−0.77,−1.3). The Stackelberg equilbria are θ∗S = (−0.53, 1.25) and θ∗S =
(1.31,−0.46), and the costs are each f(θ∗S) = (−0.81,−1.05). Hence, the ability to play before the follower
gives the leader a smaller cost at any equilibrium. The equilibrium the dynamics will converge to depends
on the initialization as we demonstrate. For this simulation, we select a decaying step-size of γi,k = 1/
√
k
for each player in the Nash gradient dynamics. The decaying step-size is chosen to be γ1,k = 1/k for
the leader and γ2,k = 1/k1/2 for the follower in the Stackelberg two-timescale dynamics. The noise at
each update step is drawn as wi,k ∼ N (0, 0.01) for each player. In Figure 2 we show the results of our
simulation. The Nash and Stackelberg dynamics converge to an equilibrium as expected. The equilibrium
that is converged to depends on the initialization. Since the costs are the same for each player at each
equilibrium, the question of which equilibrium the dynamics will reach is not significant in this example.
In Figures 2a and 2b, we visualize multiple sample learning paths for the Nash and Stackelberg dynamics,
respectively. The black lines depict D1f1 for Nash and Df1 for Stackelberg and demonstrate how the order
of play warps the first-order conditions for the leader and consequently produces equilibria which move
away from the Nash equilibria. In Figure 2c we give a detailed look at the convergence to an equilibrium
for a sample path. Finally, in Figure 2d, we present the evolution of the cost while learning and demonstrate
the benefit of being the leader and the disadvantage of being the follower.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we study the convergence of learning dynamics in Stackelberg games. This class of games
broadly pertains to any application in which there is an order of play between the players in the game.
However, the problem has not been extensively analyzed in the way the learning dynamics of simultaneous
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play games have been. Consequently, we are able to give novel convergence results and draw connections
to existing work focused on learning Nash equilibria.
We believe our work opens several future directions of research. To begin with, we intend to pursue
experimenting with GAN’s using the two-timescale algorithm we propose to learn more about the empirical
performance. Similarly, we are interested in empirically determining whether GANs converging to non-
Nash attractors are in fact converging to Stackelberg equilibria. Several works on simultaneous play games
have examined how to speed-up convergence by neutralizing rotational components of the dynamics. In
future work, we plan to explore such a question in the hierarchical learning formulation we consider. Finally,
we are interested in studying limited feedback models and general hierarchical decision problems with the
goal of influencing behavior of self-interested agents.
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Appendix A. Mathematical Preliminaries
In this appendix, we show some preliminary results on linear algebra and recall some definitions and results
from dynamical systems theory that are needed to state and prove the results in the main paper.
A.1 Proofs of Propositions 3 and 4
The results in this subsection follow from the theory of block operator matrices and indefinite linear alge-
bra [57].
The following lemma is a very well-known result in linear algebra and can be found in nearly any
advanced linear algebra text such as [26].
Lemma 3. Let W ∈ Cn×n be Hermitian with k positive eigenvalues (counted with multiplicities) and let
U ∈ Cm×n. Then
λj(UWU
∗) ≤ ‖U‖2λj(W )
for j = 1, . . . ,min{k,m, rank(UWU∗)}.
Let us define |M | = (MM>)1/2 for a matrix M . Recall also that for Propositions 3 and 4, we have
defined spec(D21f(x
∗)) = {µj , j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}} where
µ1 ≤ · · · ≤ µr < 0 ≤ µr+1 ≤ · · · ≤ µm,
and spec(−D22f(x∗)) = {λi, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}} where λ1 ≥ · · · ≥ λn > 0, given an attractor x∗.
We can now use the above Lemma to prove Proposition 3. The proof follows the main arguments in
the proof of Lemma 3.2 in the work by Berger et al. [9] with some minor changes due to the nature of our
problem.
Proof. [Proof of Proposition 3] Let x∗ be a stable attractor of x˙ = −ωS(x) such that −D22f(x∗) > 0. For
the sake of presentation, define A = D21f(x
∗), B = D12f(x∗), and C = D22f(x∗). Recall that x1 ∈ Rn
and x2 ∈ Rm. Suppose that A−BC−1B> > 0.
Claim: r ≤ n is necessary. We argue by contradiction. Suppose not—i.e., assume that r > n. Note
that if m < n, then this is not possible. In this case, we automatically satisfy that r ≤ n. Otherwise,
r ≥ m > n. Let S1 = ker(B(−C−1 + |C−1|)B>) and consider the subspace S2 of Cm spanned by the all
the eigenvectors of A corresponding to non-positive eigenvalues. Note that
dimS1 = m− rank(B(−C−1 + |C−1|)B>) ≥ m− rank(−C−1 + |C−1|) = m− n
By assumption, we have that dimS2 = r so that, since r > n,
dimS1 + dimS2 ≥ (m− n) + r = m+ (r − n) > m.
Thus, S1∩S2 6= {0}. Now, S1 = ker(B(−C−1+|C−1|)B>). Hence, for any non-trivial vector v ∈ S1∩S2,
(BC−1B> −B|C−1|B>)v = 0 so that we have
〈(A−BC−1B>)v, v〉 = 〈Av, v〉 − 〈B|C−1|B>v, v〉 ≤ 0. (12)
Note that the inequality in (12) holds because the vector v is in the non-positive eigenspace of A and
the second term is clearly non-positive. Thus, A − BC−1B> cannot be positive definite, which gives a
contradiction so that r ≤ n.
Claim: κ2λi + µi > 0 is necessary. Let the maps λi(·) denote the eigenvalues of its argument arranged in
non-increasing order. Then, by the Weyl theorem for Hermitian matrices [26], we have that
0 < λm(A−BC−1B>) ≤ λi(A) + λm−i+1(−BC−1B>), i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
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We can now combine this inequality with Lemma 3. Indeed, we have that
0 < λi(A) + ‖B‖2λm−i+1(−C−1) < µm−i+1 + κ2λm−i+1, ∀ i ∈ {m− r + p+ 1, . . . ,m}
which gives the desired result.
Since we have shown both the necessary conditions, this concludes the proof.
Now, let us prove Proposition 4 which gives sufficient conditions for when a stable non-Nash attractor x∗
of x˙ = −ω(x) is a differential Stackelberg equilibrium. Then, combining this with Proposition 1, we have
a sufficient condition under which stable non-Nash attractors are in fact stable attractors of x˙ = −ωS(x).
Proof. [Proof of Proposition 4] Let x∗ be a stable non-Nash attractor of x˙ = −ω(x) such that D21f(x∗)
and D22f(x
∗) > 0 are Hermitian. Since D2i f(x
∗), i = 1, 2 are both Hermitian, let D21f(x∗) = W1MW ∗1
with W1W ∗1 = In×n and M = diag(µ1, . . . , µm), and −D22f(x∗) = W2ΛW ∗2 with W2W ∗2 = Im×m and
Λ = diag(λ1, . . . , λn).
By assumption, there exists a diagonal matrix Σ ∈ Rm×n such that D12f(x∗) = W1ΣW ∗2 where W1
are the orthonormal eigenvectors of D21f(x
∗) and W2 are orthonormal eigenvectors of −D22f(x∗). Then,
D21f(x
∗)−D21f(x∗)>(D22f(x∗))−1D21f(x∗) = W1MW ∗1 +W1ΣW ∗2 (W2ΛW ∗2 )−1W2Σ∗W ∗1
= W1(M + ΣΛ
−1Σ∗)W ∗1
Hence, to understand the eigenstructure of the Schur complement, we simply need to compare the all neg-
ative eigenvalues of D21f(x
∗) in increasing order with the most positive eigenvalues of −D22f(x∗) in de-
creasing order. Indeed, by assumption, r ≤ n and κ2λi + µi > 0 for each i ∈ {1, . . . , r − p}. Thus,
D21f(x
∗)−D21f(x∗)>(D22f(x∗))−1D21f(x∗) > 0
since it is a symmetric matrix. Combining this with the fact that −D22f(x∗) > 0, x∗ is a differential Stack-
elberg equilibrium. Hence, by Proposition 1 it is an attractor of x˙ = −ωS(x).
A.2 Dynamical Systems Theory Primer
Definition 6. Given T > 0, δ > 0, if there exists an increasing sequence of times tj with t0 = 0 and
tj+1 − tj ≥ T for each j and solutions ξj(t), t ∈ [tj , tj+1] of ξ˙ = F (ξ) with initialization ξ(0) = ξ0 such
that supt∈[tj ,tj+1] ‖ξj(t)−z(t)‖ < δ for some bounded, measurable z(·), the we call z a (T, δ)–perturbation.
Lemma 4 (Hirsch Lemma). Given ε > 0, T > 0, there exists δ¯ > 0 such that for all δ ∈ (0, δ¯), every
(T, δ)–perturbation of ξ˙ = F (ξ) converges to an ε–neighborhood of the global attractor set for ξ˙ = F (ξ).
A key tool used in the finite-time two-timescale analysis is the nonlinear variation of constants formula
of Alekseev [1], [12].
Theorem 3. Consider a differential equation
u˙(t) = f(t, u(t)), t ≥ 0,
and its perturbation
p˙(t) = f(t, p(t)) + g(t, p(t)), t ≥ 0
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where f, g : R× Rd → Rd, f ∈ C1, and g ∈ C. Let u(t, t0, p0) and p(t, t0, p0) denote the solutions of the
above nonlinear systems for t ≥ t0 satisfying u(t0, t0, p0) = p(t0, t0, p0) = p0, respectively. Then,
p(t, t0, p0) = u(t, t0, p0) +
∫ t
t0
Φ(t, s, p(s, t0, p0))g(s, p(s, t0, p0)) ds, t ≥ t0
where Φ(t, s, u0), for u0 ∈ Rd, is the fundamental matrix of the linear system
v˙(t) =
∂f
∂u
(t, u(t, s, u0))v(t), t ≥ s (13)
with Φ(s, s, u0) = Id, the d–dimensional identity matrix.
Typical two-timescale analysis has historically leveraged the discrete Bellman-Grownwall lemma [11,
Chap. 6]. Recent application of Alekseev’s formula has lead to tighter bounds, and is thus becoming com-
monplace in such analysis.
Appendix B. Extended Analysis
The results in Section 3.2.2 leverage classical results from stochastic approximation [6, 10, 11, 31] including
recent advances in that same domain [12, 56]. Here we provide more detail on the derivation of the bounds
presented in Section 3.2.2 in order to provide insight into what the constants are in the concentration bounds
in Theorems 1 and 2. Moreover, the presentation here is somewhat distilled and the aim is to help the reader
through the analysis in Borkar and Pattathil [12] and Thoppe and Borkar [56] as it pertains to the setting we
consider. We refer the reader to each of these papers and references therein for even more detail.
As in the main body of the paper, consider a locally asymptotically stable differential Stackelberg
equilibrium x∗ = (x∗1, r(x∗1)) ∈ X and let Bq0(x∗) be an q0 > 0 radius ball around x∗ contained
in the region of attraction. Stability implies that the Jacobian JS(x∗1, r(x∗1)) is positive definite and by
the converse Lyapunov theorem [54, Chap. 5] there exists local Lyapunov functions for the dynamics
x˙1(t) = −τDf1(x1(t), r(x1(t))) and for the dynamics x˙2(t) = −D2f2(x1, x2(t)), for each fixed x1.
In particular, there exists a local Lyapunov function V ∈ C1(Rd1) with lim‖x1‖↑∞ V (x1) = ∞, and
〈∇V (x1), Df1(x1, r(x1))〉 < 0 for x1 6= x∗1.
For q > 0, let V q = {x ∈ dom(V ) : V (x) ≤ q}. Then, there is also q > q0 > 0 and 0 > 0 such that
for  < 0,
{x1 ∈ Rd1 | ‖x1 − x∗1‖ ≤ } ⊆ V q0 ⊂ N0(V q0) ⊆ V q ⊂ dom(V )
where
N0(V q0) = {x ∈ Rd1 | ∃x′ ∈ V q0 s.t.‖x′ − x‖ ≤ 0}.
An analogously defined V˜ exists for the dynamics x˙2 for each fixed x1.
For now, fix n0 sufficiently large; we specify the values of n0 for which the theory holds before the
statement of Theorem 1. Define the event En = {x¯2(t) ∈ V q ∀t ∈ [t˜n0 , t˜n]} where
x¯2(t) = x2,k +
t−t˜k
γ2,k
(x2,k+1 − x2,k)
are linear interpolates—i.e., asymptotic pseudo-trajectories—defined for t ∈ (t˜k, t˜k+1) with t˜k+1 = t˜k +
γ2,k and t˜0 = 0.
We can express the asymptotic pseudo-trajectories for any n ≥ n0 as
x¯2(t˜n+1) = x¯2(t˜n0)−
∑n
k=n0
γ2,k(D2f2(xk) + w2,k+1).
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Note that ∑n
k=n0
γ2,kD2f2(xk) =
∑n
k=n0
∫ t˜k+1
t˜k
D2f2(x1,k, x¯2(t˜k)) ds
and similarly for the w2,k+1 term, due to the fact that t˜k+1 − t˜k = γ2,k by construction. Hence, for s ∈
[t˜k, t˜k+1), the above can be rewritten as
x¯2(t) = x¯2(t˜n0) +
∫ t
t˜n0
−D2f2(x1(s), x¯2(s)) + ζ21(s) + ζ22(s) ds
where ζ21(s) = −D2f2(x1(t˜k), x¯2(t˜k))−D2f2(x1(s), x¯2(s)) and ζ22(s) = −w2,k+1. In the main body of
the paper ζ2(s) = ζ21(s) + ζ22(s).
Then, by the nonlinear variation of constants formula (Alekseev’s formula), we have
x¯2(t) = x2(t)+Φ2(t, s, x1(t˜n0), x¯2(t˜n0))(x¯2(t˜n0)−x2(t˜n0))+
∫ t
t˜n0
Φ2(t, s, x1(s), x¯2(s))(ζ21(s)+ζ22(s)) ds
where x1(t) ≡ x1 is constant (since x˙1 = 0) and x2(t) = r(x1). Moreover, for t ≥ s, Φ2(·) satisfies linear
system
Φ˙2(t, s, x0) = J2(x1(t), x2(t))Φ2(t, s, x0),
with initial data Φ2(t, s, x0) = I and x0 = (x1,0, x2,0) and where J2 the Jacobian of −D2f2(x1, ·).
Given that x∗ = (x∗1, r(x∗1)) is a stable differential Stackelberg equilibrium, J2(x∗) is positive definite.
Hence, as in [56, Lem. 5.3], we can find M , κ2 > 0 such that for t ≥ s, x2,0 ∈ V r,
‖Φ2(t, s, x1,0, x2,0)‖ ≤Me−κ2(t−s).
This result follows from standard results on stability of linear systems (see, e.g., Callier and Desoer [14, §7.2,
Thm. 33]) along with a bound on
∫ t
s ‖D22f2(x1, x2(τ, s, x˜0))−D22f2(x∗)‖dτ for x˜0 ∈ V q (see, e.g., Thoppe
and Borkar [56, Lem 5.2]).
Analogously we can define linear interpolates or asymptotic pseudo-trajectories for x1,k. Indeed,
x¯1(t) = x1,k +
t−tˆk
γ1,k
(x1,k+1 − x1,k)
are the linear interpolated points between the samples {x1,k} where tˆk+1 = tˆk + γ1,k, and tˆ0 = 0. Then, as
above, Alekseev’s formula can again be applied to get
x¯1(t) = x1(t, tˆn0 , y(tˆn0)) + Φ1(t, tˆn0 , x¯1(tˆn0))(x¯1(tˆn0)− x1(tˆn0))
+
∫ t
tˆn0
Φ1(t, s, x¯1(s))(ζ11(s) + ζ12(s) + ζ13(s)) ds
where x1(t) ≡ x∗1 (again, since x˙1 = 0) and the following hold:
ζ11(s) = Df1(x1,k, r2(x1,k))−Df1(x¯1(s), r2(x¯1(s)))
ζ12(s) = Df1(xk)−Df1(x1,k, r(x1,k))
ζ13(s) = w1,k+1
Moreover, Φ1 is the solution to a linear system with dynamics J1(x∗1, r(x∗1)), the Jacobian of−Df1(·, r(·)),
and with initial data Φ1(s, s, x1,0) = I . This linear system, as above, has bound
‖Φ1(t, s, x1,0)‖ ≤M1eκ1(t−1)
for some M1, κ1 > 0.
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Now, in addition to the linear iterpolates for x1,k and x2,k, we define an auxiliary sequence represent-
ing the leader’s conjecture about the follower with the goal of bounding the normed difference between
follower’s response and this auxiliary sequence. Indeed, using a Taylor expansion of the implicitly defined
map r, we get
zk+1 = zk +Dr(x1,k)(x1,k+1 − x1,k) + δk+1 (14)
where δk+1 are the remainder terms which satisfy ‖δk+1‖ ≤ Lr‖x1,k+1 − x1,k‖2 by assumption. Plugging
in x1,k+1,
zk+1 = zk + γ2,k
(−D2f2(x1,k, zk) + τkDr(x1,k)(w1,k+1 −Df1(x1,k, x2,k))+ γ−12,kδk+1).
The terms after −D2f2 are o(1), and hence asymptotically negligible, so that this z sequence tracks dy-
namics as x2,k. Using similar techniques as above, we can express linear interpolates of the leader’s belief
regarding the follower’s reaction as
z¯(t) = z¯(t˜n0) +
∫ t
t˜n0
−D2f2(x1(s), z¯(s)) +
∑4
j=1 ζ3j(s) ds
where the ζ3j’s are defined as follows:
ζ31(s) = −D2f2(x1(t˜k), z¯(t˜k)) +D2f2(x1(s), z¯(s))
ζ32(s) = τkDr(x1,k)w1,k+1
ζ33(s) = −τkDf1(x1,k, x2,k)Dr(x1,k)
ζ34(s) =
1
γ2,k
δk+1
with τk = γ1,k/γ2,k. Once again, Alekseev’s formula can be applied where x2(t) = r(x1) and Φ2 is the
same as in the application of Alekseev’s to x2,k. Indeed, this gives us
z¯(t˜n) = x2(t˜n) + Φ2(t˜n, t˜n0 , x1(t˜n0), z¯(t˜n0))(z¯(t˜n0)− x2(t˜n0))
+
∑n−1
k=n0
∫ t˜k+1
t˜k
Φ2(t˜n, s, x1(s), z¯(s))(−D2f2(x1(t˜k), z¯(t˜k)) +D2f2(x1(s), z¯(s))) ds (a)
+
∑n−1
k=n0
∫ t˜k+1
t˜k
Φ2(t˜n, s, x1(s), z¯(s))τkDr(x1,k)w1,k+1 ds (b)
−∑n−1k=n0 ∫ t˜k+1t˜k Φ2(t˜n, s, x1(s), z¯(s))τkDf1(x1,k, x2,k)Dr(x1,k) ds (c)
+
∑n−1
k=n0
∫ t˜k+1
t˜k
Φ2(t˜n, s, x1(s), z¯(s))
1
γ2,k
δk+1 ds (d)
Applying the linear system stability results, we get that
‖Φ2(t˜n, t˜n0 , x1(t˜n0), z¯(t˜n0))(z¯(t˜n0)− x2(t˜n0))‖ ≤ e−κ2(t˜n−t˜n0 )‖z¯(t˜n0)− x2(t˜n0)‖. (15)
Each of the terms (a)–(d) can be bound as in Lemma III.1–5 in [12]. The bounds are fairly straightforward
using (15).
Now that we have each of these asymptotic pseudo-trajectories, we can show that with high probability,
x2,k and zk asymptotically contract to one another, leading to the conclusion that the follower’s dynamics
track the leader’s belief about the follower’s reaction. Moreover, we can bound the difference between each
xi,k, using x¯i(ti,k) = xi,k, and the continuous flow xi(t) on each interval [ti,k, ti,k+1) for each i = 1, 2
and where t1,k = tˆk and t2,k = t˜k. These normed-difference bounds can then be leveraged to obtain
concentration bounds by taking a union bound across all continuous time intervals defined after sufficiently
large n0 and conditioned on the events En = {x¯2(t) ∈ V q ∀t ∈ [t˜n0 , t˜n]} and Eˆn = {x¯1(t) ∈ V q ∀t ∈
[tˆn0 , tˆn]}.
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Towards this end, define Hn0 = (‖x¯2(t˜n0 − x2(t˜n0)‖+ ‖z¯(t˜n0)− x2(t˜n0)‖),
S1,n =
∑n−1
k=n0
(∫ tˆk+1
tˆk
Φ1(tˆn, s, x¯1(tˆk))ds
)
w1,k+1,
and
S2,n =
∑n−1
k=n0
(∫ t˜k+1
t˜k
Φ2(t˜n, s, x1(t˜k), x¯2(t˜k))ds
)
w2,k+1.
Applying Lemma 5.8 [56], conditioned on En, we get there exists some constant K > 0 such that
‖x¯2(t˜n)− x2(t˜n)‖ ≤ ‖Φ2(t˜n, t˜n0 , x1, x¯2(t˜n0))(x¯2(t˜n0)− x2(t˜n0))‖+K
(
‖S2,n‖
+ supn0≤k≤n−1 γ2,k + supn0≤k≤n−1 γ2,k‖w2,k+1‖2
)
Using the bound on the linear system Φ2(·), this exactly leads to the bound
‖x¯2(t˜n)− x2(t˜n)‖ ≤ K
(
e−κ2(t˜n−t˜n0 )‖x¯2(t˜n0)− x2(t˜n0)‖
+ ‖S2,n‖+ supn0≤k≤n−1 γ2,k + supn0≤k≤n−1 γ2,k‖w2,k+1‖2
)
Thus, leveraging Lemma III.1–5 [56], we obtain the result of Lemma 1 in the main body of the paper, and
stated here for easy access.
Lemma 5 (Lemma 1 of main body). For any n ≥ n0, there exists K > 0 such that conditioned on En,
‖x2,n − zn‖ ≤K
(
‖S2,n‖+ e−κ2(t˜n−t˜n0 )Hn0 + supn0≤k≤n−1 γ2,k + supn0≤k≤n−1 γ2,k‖w2,k+1‖2
+ supn0≤k≤n−1 τk + supn0≤k≤n−1 τk‖w1,k+1‖2
)
.
Lastly, in a similar fashion we can obtain a bound for the leader’s sample path x1,k.
Lemma 6 (Lemma 2 of main body). For any n ≥ n0, there exists K¯ > 0 such that conditioned on E˜n,
‖x¯1(tˆn)− x1(tˆn)‖ ≤K¯
(
‖S1,n‖+ supn0≤k≤n−1 ‖S2,k‖+ supn0≤k≤n−1 γ2,k + supn0≤k≤n−1 τk
+ supn0≤k≤n−1 γ2,k‖w2,k+1‖2 + supn0≤k≤n−1 τk‖w1,k+1‖2
+ eκ1(tˆn−tˆn0 )‖x¯1(tˆn0)− x1(tˆn0)‖+ supn0≤k≤n−1 τkHn0
)
.
To obtain concentration bounds, the results are exactly as in Section IV [12] which follows the analysis
in [56]. Fix ε ∈ [0, 1) and let N be such that γ2,n ≤ ε/(8K), τn ≤ ε/(8K) for all n ≥ N . Let n0 ≥ N and
with K as in Lemma 1, let T be such that e−κ2(t˜n−t˜n0 )Hn0 ≤ ε/(8K) for all n ≥ n0 + T .
Using Lemma 5 and Lemma 3.1 [56],
P(‖x2,n − zn‖ ≤ ε,∀n ≥ n¯|x2,n0 , zn0 ∈ Bq0)
≥ 1− P(⋃∞n=n0 A1,n ∪⋃∞n=n0 A2,n ∪⋃∞n=n0 A3,n| x2,n0 , zn0 ∈ Bq0)
where
A1,n =
{En, ‖S2,n‖ > ε8K} , A2,n = {En, γ2,k‖w2,n+1‖2 > ε8K} ,
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and
A3,n =
{En, τn‖w1,n+1‖2 > ε8K} .
Taking a union bound gives
P(‖x2,n − zn‖ ≤ ε, ∀n ≥ n¯|x2,n0 , zn0 ∈ Bq0) ≥1−
∑∞
n=n0
P(A1,n| x2,n0 , zn0 ∈ Bq0)
+
∑∞
n=n0
P(A2,n| x2,n0 , zn0 ∈ Bq0)
+
∑∞
n=n0
P(A3,n)| x2,n0 , zn0 ∈ Bq0).
Theorem 6.2 [56], gives bounds∑∞
n=n0
P(A2,n| x2,n0 , zn0 ∈ Bq0) ≤ K1
∑∞
n=n0
exp
(
−K2
√
ε√
γ2,k
)
, (16)
∑∞
n=n0
P(A3,n)| x2,n0 , zn0 ∈ Bq0) ≤ K1
∑∞
n=n0
exp
(
−K2
√
ε√
τk
)
, (17)
and, by Theorem 6.3 [56]∑∞
n=n0
P(A1,n| x2,n0 , zn0 ∈ Bq0) ≤ K2
∑∞
n=n0
exp
(
−K3ε2βn
)
(18)
with
βn = max
n0≤k≤n−1
e−κ2(
∑n−1
i=k+1 γ2,i)γ2,k
for some K1,K2,K3 > 0. This gives the result of Theorem 1 in the main body with C1 = K1, C2 =
K2, C3 = K2, C4 = K3. An exactly analogous analysis holds for obtaining the concentration bound in
Theorem 2.
Appendix C. N–Follower Setting
In this section, we show that the results extend to the setting where there is a single leader, but N non-
cooperative followers.
C.1 N + 1 Staggered Learners, All with Non-Uniform Learning Rates
Note that if there is a layered hierarchy in which each, for example, the first follower is a leader for the
second follower, the second follower a leader for the third follower and so on, then the results in Section 3
apply under additional assumptions on the learning rates.
For instance, consider a three player setting where γ1,k = o(γ2,k) and γ2,k = o(γ3,k) so that player 1 is
the slowest player (hence, the ‘leader’), player 2 the second slowest, and player 3 the fastest, the ‘leader’.
Then similar asymptotic analysis can be applied with the following assumptions. Consider
x˙i = 0, i < 3
x˙3 = F
3(x)
}
(19)
where we will explicitly define F 3 shortly. Let x<j = (x1, . . . , xj−1) and x≥j = (xj , . . . , xN+1).
Assumption 4. There exists a Lipschitz continuous function r3(x<3) such that for any x, solutions of (19)
asymptotically converge to (x<3, r3(x<3)) given initial data x.
Consider
x˙i = 0, i < 2
x˙2 = F
2(x<3, r3(x
<3))
}
(20)
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Assumption 5. There exists a Lipschitz continuous function r2(x<2) such that for any x3, solutions of (20)
asymptotically converge to (x<2, r3(x<3)) given initial data (x<2, x≥2).
Now, define ξ≥2(x<2) = (r2(x<2), r3(x<2, r2(x<2))) for notation simplicity. Let F 3 ≡ −D3f3 and
F 2 ≡ −D1→2f2 where the notation Dj→i indicates the total derivative with respect to arguments j up to i.
Proposition 10. Under Assumptions 4 and 5 and Assumption 1 from the main paper,
lim
k→∞
‖(x2,k, x3,k)− ξ≥2(xk,1)‖ → 0 a.s.
Of course the framework naturally extends to N -followers; a similar framework can be found for rein-
forcement learning algorithms in normal form games [15].
C.2 N Simultaneously Play Followers
On the other hand, consider a setting in which the followers play a Nash equilibrium in a simultaneous play
game and are assumed to have the same learning rate. That is, γ1,k = o(γ2,k) where all N followers use
the learning rate γ2,k and the leader uses the learning rate γ1,k. The results for this section assume that the
follower game has a unique differential Nash equilibrium uniformly in x1.
Assumption 6. For every x1,  x˙2...
x˙N
 =
 −D2f2(x1, x
≥1(t))
...
−DNfN (x1, x≥1(t))

has a globally asymptotically stable differential Nash equilibrium r(x1) uniformly in x1 with r a Lr–
Lipschitz function.
All the results in Section 3 of the main body hold replacing Assumption 2 with the above assumption.
This is a somewhat strong assumption, however, N -player convex games that are diagonally strictly convex
admit unique Nash equilibria which are attracting [52].
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